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Alexander: Property Law - Estoppel by Deed, Partial Quitclaims - Walliker v.

CASE NOTES
PROPERTY LAW-Estoppel by Deed, Partial Quitclaims. Walliker v. Escott,
608 P.2d 1272 (Wyo. 1980).

On September 5, 1978, Kay Diana Escott and other
plaintiffs commenced a suit to quiet title to the oil and gas
underlying a tract of land in Park County, Wyoming.1
Defendant George F. Walliker, Jr. answered and counterclaimed, claiming title in the same property as heir to the
original entryman and patentee of the land, Geneva Walliker,
who entered it in June, 1928, under the Carey Act.2 The
plaintiffs claimed oil and gas interests in the land under
two deeds to Arthur Pearson and H. B. Robertson which
Geneva Walliker had executed in July, 1928, two weeks after
her entry. The deeds purported to remise, release, and quitclaim to Pearson and Robertson separate undivided one-third
interests "to all oil and/or gas found or to be found on that
certain lot. . . ."I At the time of these conveyances, Geneva
Walliker had not made her final proof of reclamation of the
land. Three years later she did so, and the State of Wyoming
then issued her a patent.'
The dispute in this case concerned the effectiveness of
the two deeds to transfer valid interests. George Walliker
contended that entryman Geneva Walliker could not have
conveyed any estate by the deeds, because in 1928, three
years prior to receiving a patent, she had no title or interest
to convey.' The district court agreed that in 1928 Geneva
Walliker had nothing more than an expectancy of obtaining
a patent to the land.6 The court also determined that because
the deeds were quitclaim deeds, Geneva Walliker and her
heirs were not estopped from denying that they had title at
the time of the attempted transfer.7 Thus, when the patent
ultimately issued to Geneva Walliker, it did not inure to the
benefit of Pearson and Robertson through the doctrine of
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

Brief for Appellant at 2, Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d 1272 (Wyo. 1980).
2. Id. at 2-4.
3. Opinion letter re: Escott v. Walliker, Civil No. 11141, Fifth Judicial Dis1.

trict, County of Park, State of Wyoming, (July 5, 1979), at 1.

4. Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1980).
5. Opinion letter re: Escott v. Walliker, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Id. at 2.

7. 1&- at 2-3.'
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estoppel by deed. Nonetheless, the court granted plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on the theory that when a
patent issues to a homesteader on government land, it "relates
back" to transfer title as of the date of the original entry,
thus perfecting any conveyance made by the homesteader
after the earlier date.' Under this theory, the 1928 conveyances by Geneva Walliker became effective when she
acquired the patent in 1931, and the plaintiffs acquired
valid estates as successors-in-interest to Pearson and RobertSon.
On appeal, the defendant argued that Sections 34-2-104
and 34-2-105 of the Wyoming Statutes9 foreclose the application of relation back, because the two statutes reveal a
clear legislative intent that a quitclaim deed should not
operate to transfer title which the grantor acquires after the
execution of the deed." The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court," holding that a
deed which quitclaims only a fractional mineral interest is
not a quitclaim deed under the statutes, and thus there was
no statutory bar to applying relation back in this case."
In reaching this holding, the court purported to follow the
precedent set in two Wyoming cases, Roberts v. Hudson,
and Tendolle v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, concerning the application of the doctrine of relation back. 3 It declined to discuss
8. Walliker v. Escott, supra note 4, at 1273-74.
9; WYO. STAT. § 34-2-104 (1977), provides:
Quitclaim may be in substance in the following form:
Quitclaim Deed.
A.B., grantor (here insert grantor's name or names, and place of residence) for the consideration of (here insert consideration) conveys and
quitclaims to (here insert grantee's name or names) all interest in the
following described real estate, (here insert description) situate in the
county of
"-,-in
the state of Wyoming.
WYO. STAT. § 34-2-105 (1977), provides:
Every deed in substance in the form prescribed in the foregoing section
[§ 34-2-104], when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a
sufficient conveyance, release and quitclaim to the grantee, his heirs and
assigns, in fee of all the then existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor
in the premises therein described, but shall not extend to after acquired
title unless words are added expressing such intention.
These sections are in. every relevant respect identical to the versions in
effect in 1928, 19 Wyo. COMPILED STATS. §§4617-4618 (1920).
10.
11.
12.
13.

Walliker v. Escott, supra note 4, at 1274.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1275; Roberts v. Hudson, 25 Wyo. 505, 173 P. 786 (1918); Tendolle
v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, 38 Wyo. 442, 268 P. 185 (1928) [hereinafter cited
in text as Tendole] .
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the applicability of estoppel by deed, apparently satisfied
with the adequacy of the relation back theory, and with the
trial court's determination that Geneva Walliker's deeds did
not raise an estoppel.
This note will examine the doctrine of estoppel by deed
as developed in Wyoming case law, and show how14 it could
support the result reached in Walliker v. Escott. It will
then discuss the statutory issue raised in Walliker, and show
that the court's holding unnecessarily complicates the law.
Finally, the note will suggest how the statutes and the
common law doctrine may be reconciled.
ESTOPPEL BY DEED AND QUITCLAIM DEEDS

By the common law doctrine of estoppel by deed, a deed
can have the effect of transferring a title which the grantor
subsequently acquires. When applicable the doctrine operates
to estop the grantor from denying that he had title at the
time of the transfer. 5 If the deed as a whole reveals an6
apply,"
intent to pass a definite estate, the doctrine can
7
but it does not apply to a true quitclaim deed.' The distinguishing feature of a quitclaim deed is that it conveys
the grantor's interest in the property rather than the property itself.'8 Such a deed implies no definite estate or interest
in the grantor, and conveys only the grantor's right, title
9
and interest at the time of execution. It does not raise an
estoppel in the grantor to effect a passing of after acquired
title to the grantee.2 0
This common law rule that a quitclaim deed does not
raise an estoppel is reflected in Sections 34-2-104 and 34-2105 of the Wyoming Statutes.2 Section 34-2-104 provides
that a quitclaim "may be in substance in the following form,"
14. Walliker v. Escott, 8upra note 4 rhereinafter cited in text as Walliker].
15. 23 AM. JUR. 2d Deeds § 294 (1965).
16. Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434, 436 (1899).
Wyo.

Id. at 28-29; Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 62
370, 168 P.2d 565, 566 (1946).
18. Balch v. Arnold, supra note 16, at 435; Annot., 3 A.L.R. 945 (1919).
19. Balch v. Arnold, supra note 16, at 435.
20. Id. at 28-29; Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., supra note
17.

17, at 566.
21. WYO. STAT. §§ 33-2-104 and 34-2-105 (1977).
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and gives a model." Section 34-2-105 says that any deed
which "in substance" conforms to the model will convey the
then existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor "but
shall not extend to after acquired title unless words are added
expressing such intention." 3 Neither statute states that to
be a quitclaim deed, the deed must conform to the statutory
model; the statutes only go so far as to say a quitclaim deed
may be in the form indicated. Nor does either statute imply
that nonconforming deeds will pass after acquired title.
Thus, a deed not conforming to Section 34-2-104 should still
be subject to the common law rules; if it conveys nothing
more than the grantor's interest, no after acquired title
should pass by way of estoppel.
In Walliker, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
two deeds purporting to remise, release and quitclaim undivided one-third interests in oil and gas did not substantially conform to Section 34-2-104, and therefore did not
trigger the effect prescribed in Section 34-2-105." However, the court did not determine whether the deeds were
quitclaim deeds which could not raise an estoppel under
common law, but held that the grantor's after acquired title
passed to the grantees under the relation back theory. 5 The
alternative would have been to find that the deeds were not
true quitclaim deeds under common law, and that the after
acquired title therefore inured to the grantees by way of
estoppel by deed. The court might then have proceeded along
the lines of the following analysis.
The ultimate criterion for determining whether a deed
is a common law quitclaim deed is the intent of the parties
as revealed by the deed itself and by the surrounding circumstances." The wording of the granting clause and the
presence or absence of title covenants or an habendum clause
have been ruled relevant to show whether the intent of the
deed is to convey the property itself or merely grantor's
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

WYO. STAT. § 34-2-104 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 34-2-105 (1977).
Walliker v. Escott, supra note 4, at 1275-76.
See text accompanying notes 7-12, supra.
Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair-'Wyoming- Oil, Co., supra note 17, at 568,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/10

4

Alexander: Property Law - Estoppel by Deed, Partial Quitclaims - Walliker v.

1981

CASE NOTES

273

present interest in the property." In relevant part, the
Walliker deeds read as follows:
[T]he party of the first part... has Remised,
Released and Quit-Claimed

.

. an undivided one-

third interest in and to all oil and/or gas found or
to be found on that certain lot ...

Together with

all and singular the tenements hereditaments and
appurtenances thereunto belonging....
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, ALL and singular
the above mentioned and described premises.... 28
This deed uses only words of quitclaim in the granting
clause, and lacks title covenants, yet it appears to convey
not just grantor's interest in the oil and gas, but a definite
one-third interest in the oil and gas. The habendum clause
also evidences the intent to convey a definite estate. The
question then arises as to which of these indicia of intent
should be regarded as controlling. In Tendolle 9 the Wyoming
Supreme Court examined a deed very similar to this one
and determined that the deed was not a quitclaim deed.
While the Tendolle deed is distinguishable in that the granting clause includes the words "grant," "bargain," and "sell"
in addition to "release" and "quitclaim," the court there said
that the words of grant were "not in our opinion so important as the fact that the deed purports to transfer a
definite, specific interest.""0 The interest conveyed was, as
in the Walliker deeds, a fractional mineral interest, and the
deed contained a similar habendum clause. 1 Thus Tendolle
supports the conclusion that, facially, the Walliker deeds
show an intent to transfer more than grantor's interest,
and thus are not quitclaim deeds.
As previously noted, an examination of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a deed may help to
determine its intent. For example, the Wyoming Supreme
Court in Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair Wyoming Co.8"
considered the effect of a deed facially very close to the the
27. Id. at 567-69; Balch v. Arnold, supra note 16, at 436.
28. Opinion letter re: Escott v. Walliker, supra note 3.
29. Tendolle v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, supra note 13.

30. Id. at 450.
31.

Id. at 446.

32. Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., supra note. 16.
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Tendolle and Walliker deeds. The deed purported to "remise,
release and quitclaim" a fractional: mineral interest in
certain lands. It contained an habendum clause, but no
covenants of warranty." While the court took a restrictive
view of the conveyances that will give rise to an estoppel, "4
it did not hold that the features of the deed alone precluded
an estoppel. Instead, it found the underlying circumstances
dispositive. The deed had been executed by a trustee whom
prior owners had set up as a "straw man" to redistribute
their interests through a sequence of conveyances.2 The court
noted that the trustee "was hardly in, a position to give any
other kind of a deed [other than a quitclaim deed],"" and
that "[n] o purchase or sale in the ordinary way was contemplated."37 The court went on to say that even if the deed
was more than a quitclaim deed,., there was no justification
for applying the doctrine-of estoppel to pass after acquired
property. 8 Thus, in deciding whether to apply estoppel, the
court considered the circumstances of the original grant
to be as important as the facial features of the deed.
In Walliker, the undisputed facts do not disclose the
parties' understanding as to the state 'of title or the interest
to be conveyed. Yet it is appropriate to ask, as Justice Cardozo
once did, "Was it all sound and fury, signifying nothing?"".
Considering that Geneva, Walliker was. in the process of
obtaining a fee interest from the government when she
executed the deeds to Pearson and: Robertson,4" it is logical
that the parties would have expected the after acquired
title to pass. It would be absurd to conclude that they intended the deeds to convey Walliker's present interest only,
since, barring fraud, the parties would have known that an
effectuation of that intent could accomplish nothing. The
Walliker court disapproved such a conclusion, noting that
Id. at 567.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
.
.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Outlet Embroidery Co., Inic. v. Derwent Mills, Ltd.. 254-N.Y. 179, 172 N.E.
462 (1930). C.f., Macbeth, V.iii.
--.
40. Walliker v.7:Escott,.stpra note 4-,at 1273.

-33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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nothing in the record evidenced that the grantees "intended
to engage in a futile act in obtaining the quitclaim deeds."'"
An examination of the Walliker deeds and the circumstances of their execution thus raises the inference that the
parties intended a conveyance of a definite estate and not
merely a release of the grantor's then existing estate. This
inference then constitutes a basis on which the court might
have held that Geneva Walliker and her heirs were estopped
from denying that she had title when she executed the two
deeds. Thus estoppel by deed provides an alternate rationale
for the court's holding that the Walliker grantees obtained
good title once Geneva Walliker perfected her own interest
in the land.
THE STATUTORY ISSUE IN WALLIKER

In Walliker, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's holding that Geneva Walliker's patent related back to the date on which she entered the land.2 The
deeds issued subsequent to entry were then operative to
pass title to the grantees, Pearson and Robertson. In reaching this result, the court faced the question whether Sections
34-2-104 and 34-2-105 could foreclose the operation of relation back to transfer after acquired title. If "after acquired
title" in Section 34-2-105 includes title which a homesteader
on government land is in the process of obtaining, then the
title obtained upon issuance of a patent should not relate
back to benefit a grantee under a prior quitclaim deed, so
long as the deed is "in substance in the form prescribed. ... ",
This was the argument submitted by the appellant, George
Walliker.4" The court obviated the argument by distinguishing the Walliker deeds from the statutory form, thus rendering the question moot. It said that a deed quitclaiming
a fractional mineral interest is not a quitclaim deed within
the meaning of Section 34-2-105." In distinguishing the
deeds, the court emphasized the partial release of grantor's
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1278.
See text accompanying notes 7-12, supra.
WYO. STAT. § 34-2-105 (1977). ,
See text accompanying notes 9-10, supra.
Walliker v. Escott, supra note 4, at 1275-76.
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interest in the Walliker deeds, noting that the statutory
model calls for a release of grantor's entire interest.4" The
court justified this distinction in terms of the grantee's
expectations; where a grantor has released his entire interest, there remains no implication of any equitable right in
the grantor capable of ripening into a legal title which
would then pass to the grantee. Therefore a grantee under
such a deed has no legitimate expectation of perfecting his
interest through any doctrine of after acquired title. On the
other hand, when a grantor merely quitclaims a partial
mineral interest while retaining equitable surface rights,
a grantee can logically expect the grantor to eventually
perfect legal title and thereby perfect grantee's mineral
interest. 7 In support of its result, the court cited Tendolle,"
where a similar tactic was employed to avoid the same
question, i.e., whether the two statutes affect the operation
of relation back. The Tendolle court determined that the
deed involved was not a quitclaim deed, without making any
distinction between quitclaim deeds under the statutes and
under common law. The court then concluded that the statutory effect was not triggered. 9
At first blush the Tendolle and Walliker holdings appear
congruent. Both say, in effect, that a deed quitclaiming a
fractional mineral interest does not fall within Sections 342-104 and 34-2-105. Nevertheless, the rationale adopted in
Walliker departs substantially from that developed in Tendolle, and could lead to a different result in other cases.
Tendolle hinges on the distinction between a deed purporting
to convey only the grantor's interest in a property, and a
deed purporting to convey the property itself.5" This comports with the common law notion that a quitclaim deed is
one which conveys only the grantor's interest; the court in
Tendolle seemed to read the common law definition into the
statutes. On the other hand, the court in Walliker makes a
new distinction between a deed which purports to convey
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1274-75.
Id.
Tendolle v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, note 13, 8upra.
Id. at 449-50.
See text accompanying notes 29-31, aupra.
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the grantor's entire interest, and a deed which purports to
convey only part of the grantor's interest.
The following examples show that the Walliker holding
departs substantially from Tendolle in its effect:
0 "quitclaims" to A
1) "Blackacre in fee simple absolute."
2) "an undivided one-fourth interest in the oil and
gas in place in Blackacre."
3) "an undivided one-fourth of any mineral interest
in place which I have in Blackacre."
4) "all my interest in the oil or gas in place in Blackacre."
In (1) Tendolle controls, so that despite the quitclaim
language, and despite O's conveying his entire interest, the
deed cannot be a quitclaim deed because it purports to convey a specific estate, i.e. "Blackacre in fee simple absolute."
Tendolle would also suffice to determine that (2) is
not a quitclaim either. Again the language purports to
convey a specific estate regardless of the grantor's interest.
On the other hand, Walliker would merely indicate that
since (2) quitclaims only a fractional mineral interest, it
does not substantially conform to the statutory model.
Walliker leaves open the question whether (2) might qualify
as a quitclaim deed under common law. Thus whereas Tendolle leaves room for reading the statutory form quitclaim
as equivalent to a common law quitclaim deed, Walliker
implies a severance of the two.
In (3) the severance becomes clear. Tendolle and common law would undoubtedly classify this conveyance as a
true quitclaim, because it purports to convey no more than
the grantor's interest. Walliker simply adds that this deed,
a true quitclaim deed for most purposes, does not release
all of the grantor's interest and therefore does not substantially conform to the statutory model. This result does not
seem to be supported by anything in Tendolle, and marks
the point at which Walliker departs from precedent.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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In (4) grantor releases all of, but no more than,
grantor's interest in the described property. The conveyance
should therefore meet the criteria of both Tendolle and
Walliker as regarding conformance with the statutory form,
barring of course all external considerations such as any
other language in the deed or attendant circumstances.
Unlike Tendolle, Walliker reaches divergent results in
(3) and (4). Under Walliker, if O's deed purports to quitclaim "all my interest in the oil or gas in place in Blackacre,"
the deed should be held a quitclaim deed within Section
34-2-104, but if it purports to quitclaim "an undivided onefourth of any mineral interest in place which I have in
Blackacre," it should not be so held. While a literal reading
of the statute supports this distinction, there seems to be no
reason for it inherent in the nature of the grants. Nothing
in the court's discussion of the grantee's expectations as
regards the grantor's future perfection of title"' offers any
clue to why different results should obtain in (3) and (4).
The Walliker deeds fall squarely in the category represented by (2) above; they purport to convey a specific interest consisting of a fraction of the whole mineral estate.
Thus, as shown in (2), the criterion developed in Tendolle
suffices to determine that the deeds are not quitclaim deeds,
and thus do not invoke the two quitclaim statutes. The
Walliker court's rationale and holding add nothing to this
result except a distinction between quitclaim deeds under
the statutes and quitclaim deeds at common law. This distinction is cast in terms of whether or not the deed conveys
the grantor's entire interest. Yet, as shown in the examples,
the distinction is unnecessary to decide the case and unnecessarily complicates the construction of the statute.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming Statutes Sections 34-2-104 and 34-2-105 seem
to have the purpose of legitimizing what was already true
at common law, i.e. quitclaim deeds do not pass after-acquired
title by estoppel. The presence of a model quitclaim in the
51. See text accompanying note 46, supra.
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statutes enables the drafter of a deed to proceed with greater
certainty of the deed's effect than he would have following
common law principles alone. However, both statutes expressly refer to the "substance" of the model deed.52 What
constitutes "substance" is not further defined. It seems
redundant to set up a statutory standard for quitclaim deeds
wholly separate from a common law standard, unless there
exists some reason the two should produce different results.
This suggests that an efficient construction of the statute
might include a reading-in of the common law tests, so that
a deed conforming "in substance" with the statutory model
would be equivalent to one passing as a quitclaim deed at
common law. For the time being, however, the Walliker
holding forecloses this reading, so that the determination of
whether a deed is a quitclaim must remain a two-step process.
JOHN ALEXANDER
52. Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-2-104, 34-2-105 (1977).
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